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THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF
NUISANCE LAW AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
Keith N. Hyltont
INTRODUCTION
Environmental regulation, like any sort of regulation, can be
implemented through different types of legal rules. The regulatory
standard could be a set of command-and-control rules determining
precisely how much of a pollutant can be emitted by a source, or what
type of abatement procedures must be adopted. Alternatively, the
regulatory standard could be based on a liability rule which requires
the source of a pollutant to pay a monetary penalty that is equal to the
harm imposed on society by its environmental interferences. Under a
command-and-control system, the polluter is required to comply with
some quantitative limit, at risk of a severe penalty such as dissolution,
if the source is a corporation, or incarceration, if the source is a
person. Under the liability rule system, the polluter is expected to pay
for the harm it imposes on society, and is free to choose whether, as
well as the degree to which, it will continue in its activity.'
In addition to rule types, there can be different approaches to
environmental law enforcement. The two basic schemes are public
and private enforcement. Public enforcement can be viewed as a
system of government agencies that identify environmental
interferences and bring enforcement actions against the sources.
t Professor of Law and Paul J. Liacos Scholar, Boston University, knhylton@bu.edu.
I The distinction between command-and-control rules and liability rules is analogous to
that between property and liability rules. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972); Keith N. Hylton
(2006) Property Rules and Liability Rules, Once Again, 2 REV. OF LAW & ECON. 137 (2006),
available at http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol2/iss2/artl/.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Private enforcement is a system in which private parties, typically the
victims, bring enforcement actions against the sources.
These distinctions generate four regime types: public enforcement
with command-and-control rules, public enforcement with liability
rules, private enforcement with command-and-control rules, and
private enforcement with liability rules. Traditional nuisance law has
operated largely as an environmental regulation regime based on
private enforcement with liability rules. Modem statutory
environmental law tends toward the model of public enforcement
with command-and-control rules.2 Interestingly, this leaves two
regime types that have been relatively unexplored in the context of
modem environmental regulation: private with command-and-control
rules and public with liability rules. With such a large amount of the
regulatory design space still unexploited, it is reasonable to have the
suspicion that an optimal environmental regulatory scheme might
involve methods that look quite different from existing approaches.
I have argued elsewhere that environmental regulation could be
improved by moving in the direction of the traditional nuisance law
model.3 The goal of any serious reform effort should be to find the
right combination within the array of four regime types.
In this article, I will explore in detail the structure of nuisance law
as a mechanism for regulating environmental interferences and
suggest a modernized enforcement regime. The modem regime would
retain public enforcement primarily in identifying environmental
harms. Public enforcement might also be retained in the discovery of
sources of harm, as long as it is more efficient than private
enforcement in that task. However, enforcement efforts in the
proposed regime would largely be delegated to private enforcers.
Moreover, the decentralized approach would permit tougher
environmental rules than under the public enforcement approach in
some areas, and perhaps weaker regulations in other areas, depending
on the seriousness of potential injuries. One-size-fits-all would be
replaced by regional variation.4
2 For an analysis of the reasons, see Nathaniel 0. Keohane et al., The Choice of
Regulatory Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 313 (1998). See
also Richard L. Revesz and Robert N. Stavins, Environmental Law and Policy (Harvard Public
Law Working Paper No. 102, 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=552043 (discussing
the historical dominance of command-and-control).
3 Keith N. Hylton, When Should We Prefer Tort Law to Environmental Regulation?, 41
WASHBURN L. J. 515 (2002). For excellent articles arguing that nuisance law should remain an
important part of environmental law enforcement, see Andrew Jackson Heimert, Keeping Pigs
Out of Parlors: Using Nuisance Law to Affect the Location of Pollution, 27 ENVTL. L. 403
(1997); Jason J. Czarneski & Mark L. Thomsen, Advancing the Rebirth of Environmental
Common Law, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 1 (2007).
4 See, e.g., Heimert, supra note 3; Czarneski & Thomsen, supra note 3.
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The policy proposals in this article are not new. The argument that
nuisance law should be permitted to do more of the work of
environmental regulation has been advanced by others.5  My
contribution in this article is largely technical. Although nuisance law
has existed for a long time, there have been few, if any, efforts to use
economic analysis to make sense of its details.6 My aim is to provide
a positive economic theory of nuisance doctrine and to use that theory
to explain the benefits of moving to a more decentralized approach to
environmental regulation.7
I. SOME BASIC TRADEOFFS
The basic tradeoff between public and private enforcement is
between what I will call decentralization inefficiencies and the agency
cost problem. Private enforcement is hampered by decentralization
inefficiencies. Public enforcement is hampered by the agency cost
problem.
The decentralization inefficiencies of private enforcement are well
known and need only brief mention here. Because environmental
interferences injure a large number of victims at the same time,
enforcement of environmental regulations provides a public good, in
the sense that many people share in the benefits of enforcement. Thus,
enforcement of environmental law suffers from the weaknesses
inherent in the provision of public goods,8 in the sense that
5 See Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern
Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 923 (1999); BRUCE YANDLE, COMMON SENSE
AND COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: CREATING WEALTH IN HUMMINGBIRD
ECONOMIES (Rowman & Littlefield 1997); THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Roger
E. Meiners & Andrew Morriss, eds., 2000).
6 For applications of economics to nuisance law, see A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving
Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L.
REV. 1075 (1980); Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, Toward a Total-Cost Approach to
Environmental Instrument Choice (June 23, 2001) (unpublished working paper, on file with
SSRN), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract-274768. Both of these studies focus on the
choice of instruments (damages or injunctions) rather than the specific doctrines of nuisance
law. For economic analyses of one specific feature of nuisance law (the "coming to the
nuisance" doctrine), see Rohan Pitchford & Christopher M. Snyder, Coming to the Nuisance:
An Economic Analysis From an Incomplete Contracts Perspective, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 491
(2003); Donald Wittman, First Come, First Served: An Economic Analysis of "Coming to the
Nuisance", 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 557 (1980). For one application of economics to nuisance law
generally, see Keith N. Hylton, A Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 977,
993-1006 (1996). This article stays within the same general approach of my earlier article, but
takes a much closer look at the economic function of nuisance doctrine.
I On the case for decentralization, see Jonathan H. Adler, Free and Green: A New
Approach to Environmental Protection, 24 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 653 (2001).
8 Since members of the public can enjoy a public good whether or not they invest money
or effort into its creation, there is an incentive in large groups for members to shirk from
contributing to the public good. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUB.
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 9-16 (1971).
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enforcement incentives are too weak relative to the benefits of
enforcement. The same problem is observed quite obviously in the
area of national defense. Unless a government provides the benefit,
individuals are likely to have weak incentives to invest in national
defense.
The agency cost problem is a label that I will use to describe the
suboptimal outcomes that result because the public enforcement agent
is likely to have incentives that differ from those of the hypothetical
principle.9 The hypothetical principle, a social planner committed to
maximizing society's welfare, would adopt an environmental
regulation scheme that minimizes the sum of the costs of
environmental injuries, avoidance costs, and administrative costs. The
public enforcement agent may have incentives that are skewed from
this objective for several reasons: malfeasance, lack of interest, and
lack of information. Public enforcers can be bribed by regulated
parties. 10 They may over or under-invest in enforcement efforts
because their compensation arrangements fail to align their incentives
with the social objective. Or, public enforcers may support laws that
benefit a concentrated interest group while providing no benefit to, or
perhaps harming, the majority. Finally, public enforcers will not have
access to information that is held privately, and as a result may be
unable to find optimal solutions, even if they sincerely attempt to find
them.
To understand the potential benefits of private enforcement, it will
help to look deeper into the common law regime. In particular, it will
help to examine the economic function of nuisance law.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES AND
NUISANCE LAW
In this part, I will set out a simple economic model of externality
and use the model to provide a positive theory of the law on
9 The term "agency costs" was introduced in the context of the theory of the firm. Jensen
and Meckling argued that managers have incentives that often diverge from those of the
shareholders, and the suboptimal outcomes that result could be described as agency costs. See
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Theory of Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
"0 Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the
Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974).
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nuisance." The theory set out in this part also explains the law on
strict liability generally.
12
A. Activity Levels and Care Levels
The law and economics literature has distinguished between care
and activity levels. 13 The care level refers to the level of instantaneous
precaution that an actor takes when engaged in some activity. For
example, an actor can take more care while in the activity of driving
by moderating his speed or looking more frequently to both sides of
the road. The activity level refers the actor's decision with respect to
the frequency or location of his activity. If, for example, the activity
of concern is driving, it can be reduced by driving less frequently.
Alternatively, a driver can change the nature of the activity by
altering its location or the technology used in it. Changing the
frequency, location, or technology of engaging in an activity are all
methods of altering the activity level.
Many environmental harms, especially the ones that are associated
with nuisance law, can be viewed as costs associated with activity
level choices-i.e., byproducts of activities. Consider, for example, a
manufacturer that dumps toxic chemicals into the water as a
byproduct of its manufacturing activity. Suppose the manufacturer is
taking the level of care that would be required by the law of
negligence. In spite of this, the manufacturing process leads to some
level of discharge of toxic chemicals into the water supply. In this
scenario, a common one in discussions of environmental economics,
the environmental harm is a negative externality associated with the
manufacturer's activity level choice. The manufacturer could reduce
the negative externality by cutting back its scale of production, by
changing its location, or by changing the production technology in a
way that cuts emissions.
Whether we are considering the activity of driving a car or that of
manufacturing, the model examined here is of activities that impose
external costs on society even when they are carried out with great
care (reasonable care under the law). The question I consider here is
11 My focus is on the nuisance doctrine rather than the economics of environmental
policy. However, the two are clearly related. On the theory of externalities and its implications
for environmental policy, see WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988) (1975).
12 See Hylton, supra note 6; Keith N. Hylton, A Positive Theory of Strict Liability (Boston
University School of Law Working Paper No. 06-35, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract-932600.
13 See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980);
Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of Tort Doctrine and the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 54 VAND.
L. REV. 1413, 1414-1423 (2001).
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how the law can regulate activity levels in a way that leads to optimal
decisions.
B. The Economics ofActivity Level Choices
For any activity, the actor engaged in it will set his privately
optimal activity level at the point which maximizes his utility from
that activity. That means the actor will consider the benefits he
derives from the activity as well as the costs, and choose a level at
which the excess of private benefits over private costs is at its
maximum. If we let MPB represent the incremental or marginal
private benefits to the actor from his activity, and MPC represent the
incremental private costs to the actor from increasing the scale of
activity, the actor will increase his activity level as long as the
marginal private benefit of an additional unit of activity exceeds the
marginal private cost (MPB > MPC). The privately optimal level of
activity is the level at which the marginal private benefit to the actor
is just equal to the marginal private cost (MPB = MPC).
The diagram labeled Figure 1 can be used to elaborate this
argument. Assuming marginal benefits diminish as the actor increases
his activity level, the marginal private benefit schedule can be
represented by a downward sloping line, as shown in Figure 1.
Marginal private benefits decline because the actor gains less in
utility from an additional unit of the activity as his activity level
expands.14 The marginal private cost schedule is assumed to increase
as the actor increases his level of activity (see MPC in figure 1). The
reason for this is that the incremental cost of the activity goes up as
the actor increases his scale. 15 The actor's privately optimal activity
level choice is given by the intersection of the marginal private
benefit and marginal private cost schedules, shown by point A in
Figure 1. At the intersection point, the net benefits (excess of private
benefits over private costs) is at its maximum.
14 To take a simple example, suppose the activity level is "eating ice cream." As the actor
reaches his 1 0 0 th scoop of ice cream, his gain from consuming an additional scoop is assumed to
be less than if he had consumed only 1 scoop. Similarly, if we think of the marginal private
benefit from driving, the assumption is that the gain to the actor from increasing his mileage is
less when he drives 100 miles per week than if he were driving only 10 miles per week. Of
course, in the case of driving, it is more likely that the marginal benefit schedule rises and then
falls. For simplicity, I will focus on the portion over which it falls.
"1 For example, if the activity is driving, the upward sloping MPC schedule assumes that
it is more costly to go from 50 miles per week to 51 than to go from 10 miles per week to 11. Of
course, this assumption may not be valid in some cases. The incremental cost of going from 50
to 51 miles per week may be the same, in some cases, as the incremental costs of going from 10
to 11, but the results of this analysis are not dependent on this assumption of increasing
marginal cost.
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Now I will introduce externalities into the analysis. On the cost
side, there are negative externalities (or external costs) associated
with many activities. Suppose the activity is driving. With each mile
driven, the actor imposes some risk of harm from an accident or from
pollution on the public in general. Or, if the activity is manufacturing,
with each widget produced, a manufacturer who discharges chemicals
in the water imposes clean-up costs on others. The marginal social
cost of the actor's activity is simply the sum of the marginal private
cost and the marginal external cost imposed on society.
On the benefit side, it is possible that there are benefits to society
generated by the actor's activity. Consider driving again. If the
number of drivers increases from one to two, both drivers will have
the added safety that if anything goes wrong on the road (e.g., a car
falls into a giant pothole), they will find someone who can help them
or call for help. In the manufacturing case, suppose that instead of
producing widgets, the manufacturer is producing a vaccine for some
communicable disease. The marginal social benefit is the sum of the
marginal private benefit and the marginal external benefit of an
additional unit of activity.
The final step of this introduction to the economics of activity
level choices is to consider the differences between private and social
incentives. Consider the case of low externalities on both the cost and
benefit sides first. Suppose there are external costs and external
benefits connected to the activity, but they are relatively modest.
They are shown in Figure 1 by MSC (low externality) and MSB (low
externality). The socially optimal level of activity, which equates
marginal social benefit and marginal social cost, is found at the point
B in Figure 1. In this case, the socially optimal level of activity (B) is
roughly the same as the privately optimal level of activity (A). The
reason is that the modest positive and negative externalities cancel
each other out. Given this, there is no reason for government (the law)
to intervene to try to reduce the level of activity.
Now consider the case of high externality on the cost side and low
externality on the benefit side. This is shown by the intersection of the
MSC (high externality) and MSB (low externality), which is shown by
point C in Figure 1. In this case, there is a wide divergence between
the privately optimal level of activity (point A) and the socially
optimal level of activity (point C). This case is one in which it
appears desirable for the government to intervene to reduce the level
of activity. Indeed, in the case of very high externality on the cost side
(see MSC (very high externality)), it may be desirable to shut down
the activity completely.
2008]
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Consider lastly the case of low externality on the cost side and
high externality on the benefit side. The intersection of the marginal
social cost and marginal social benefit schedules occurs at point D in
Figure 1. In this case, the privately optimal level of activity (A) is
substantially below the socially optimal level (G). Thus, the
government should intervene to increase the actor's level of activity.
FIGURE 1
SMSC (high externality)CMS (very higheextrnality
MSC (low externality)
iCE
A MSA? (h axternalitv)
MSB (lw externality)
Activity
C. Introducing the Law
I have so far considered external costs and external benefits
associated with activities conducted with reasonable care. Since the
actors are assumed to be taking reasonable care, the negligence rule
cannot influence their activity level choices. 16 The negligence rule
holds the actor liable only when he fails to take reasonable care. Since
the actors are assumed to have taken reasonable care in the foregoing
analysis, the negligence rule will not lead to any findings of liability.
16 This assumes courts operate without error and that litigation is not costly. If courts
make mistakes and litigation is costly, compliance with the negligence standard does not reduce
liability costs to zero. On litigation costs and judicial error, see Keith N. Hylton, Costly
Litigation and Legal Error Under Negligence, 6 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 433 (1990).
[Vol. 58:3
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Strict liability imposes liability on actors even when they have
taken reasonable care. The legal system can influence activity levels
through imposing strict liability. In this part, I will examine the
conditions under which strict liability leads to optimal, or
approximately optimal, activity levels.
First, consider the case in which externality is high on the cost side
and low on the benefit side. The socially optimal scale in this case is
point C in Figure 1. In the absence of strict liability, the privately
optimal scale is point A. Imposing strict liability on the actor is
probably desirable in this case. When strict liability is imposed on the
actor, his marginal private cost schedule becomes equivalent to the
marginal social cost schedule. In the case of high externality on the
cost side coupled with low externality on the benefit side, the actor's
privately optimal activity level under strict liability will be point E. It
is not exactly the optimal level, which is at point C, but it is close.
Social welfare will most likely be improved by using liability to lead
the actor to produce at scale E rather than at the socially excessive
scale A.
Now consider the case in which externality is low both on the cost
and on the benefit side. The socially optimal scale of activity is
associated with point B. The privately optimal level of activity is
associated with point A. These are the same activity levels. If strict
liability is imposed on the actor, it will reduce his activity level below
the socially optimal scale, and therefore reduce social welfare. If strict
liability is imposed on the actor, it will lead him to choose the scale F,
which is below the socially optimal scale.
This analysis implies that strict liability is desirable only when the
external costs of the actor's activity substantially exceed the external
benefits associated with the actor's activity. In this case, imposing
strict liability reduces activity levels to a point that is closer to the
socially optimal scale than would be observed under the negligence
rule. When the external benefits are roughly equal to or greater than
the social costs associated with the actor's activity, strict liability is
not socially desirable.
Another case in which strict liability is not socially desirable is
observed when two actors cross-externalize equivalent costs. Put
another way, when the costs externalized by two actors to each other
are reciprocal, strict liability is not socially preferable to negligence.
The reason is that under strict liability, you will pay for harms to
others, while under negligence (when everyone is complying with the
negligence standard) you will pay only for the harms you suffer.
20081
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Since those harms are the same, activity levels will not differ under
the two regimes.
17
D. Application to Law: Nuisance and Abnormally Dangerous
Activities
To this point, I have presented a model of the economics of
externalities and considered its implications for law. Now I will take a
look at the law, to see if it conforms to the predictions of the model,
and to see if the model gives us additional insights into the law.
1. Abnormally Dangerous Activities
The most straightforward application of this model is to the law of
abnormally dangerous activities. Section 520 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts provides the following rules:
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous,
the following factors are to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the
person, land or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable
care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common
usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is
carried on and;
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed
by its dangerous attributes.
18
I7 To see this, consider the marginal private cost schedule under strict liability and under
negligence. Assume the level of externality is low. Suppose there are two actors, X and Y, both
of whom are exercising reasonable care. Under strict liability, X will be liable to Y for the
harms he causes to Y, and X will not have to bear any harms imposed on him by Y (because he
will be compensated). Under negligence, X will not be liable to Y for the harms he causes to Y,
but will have to bear any harms imposed on him by Y. Since the harms are, by assumption,
reciprocal in nature, the actors' private marginal cost schedules are the same under strict liability
and under negligence. Hence, there is no reason to opt for strict liability over negligence. See
Hylton, A Positive Theory of Strict Liability, supra note 12.
Is RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES § 520
(1977).
[Vol. 58:3
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The provisions of Section 520 are largely in line with the theory
set out in the previous part of this article. First, note that Section 520
can be divided into two parts, the first three provisions and the last
three provisions. The first three provisions govern the degree of
residual risk. They imply that strict liability for operating an
abnormally dangerous activity is appropriate only when the residual
risk-the risk that remains after the actor takes reasonable care-is
high. If the residual risk of the actor's activity is high, strict liability
may be appropriate. On the other hand, if the residual risk is relatively
low, strict liability would be inappropriate under Section 520.19
The final three provisions of Section 520 line up with the language
in Rylands v. Fletcher,20 which provides the foundation for the law on
abnormally dangerous activities. The third factor, common usage,
helps us identify activities for which the risks are reciprocal to those
of other common activities. If an activity is one of common usage,
then actors engaged in those activities will impose reciprocal risks on
each other, and there is therefore no basis for adopting strict liability
over negligence. The fourth factor, inappropriateness, is another way
of determining whether the activity imposes a reciprocated risk. The
last provision, comparing benefits and risks, guides courts to compare
the external benefits thrown off by the activity with the external
costs. 2' If the external costs are great relative to the external benefits,
strict liability is appropriate under this provision.22
'9 Ind. Harbor Belt R. R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174(7th Cir. 1990).
20 L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868) (affirming and quoting the Court of Exchequer Chamber, "[w]e
think that the true rule of law is that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land
and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his
peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the
natural consequences of its escape.").
21 The notion of beneficial externalities arising from the conduct of an activity should not
be confused with the ultimate result or end of the activity. Consider, for example, the activity of
blasting, which the law generally deems an abnormally dangerous activity. One might argue that
blasting to create a public road produces an item (the road) that yields widely dispersed benefits.
Accordingly, one might continue, blasting to produce something that benefits the public
generally should be exempted from strict liability. However, this argument confuses the analysis
by focusing on the externalities associated with the activity's end rather than the externalities
associated with the activity. Unless the activity of blasting produces a substantial beneficial
externality (e.g., the blaster is destroying a substance that imposes a great risk on the public), it
should be subjected to strict liability under the theory presented here.
22 Consider an example. If the actor holds a lion as a pet in his backyard, he will
inevitably impose a great risk on his neighbors. Moreover, it is a risk that remains great even
after the actor has taken reasonable care. For this reason, holding a lion as a pet satisfies the first
three elements of the Section 520 test. The last three elements are also satisfied. Holding a lion
as a pet is not a common activity-the risk the lion-holder externalizes to his neighbors is not
equivalent to the risk they externalize to him. The benefits externalized to neighbors from
holding a lion as a pet are likely to be far less than the risks externalized to them. For these
reasons, it is appropriate under the theory of this article and under Section 520 to apply strict
liability to the activity of holding lions as pets.
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2. Nuisance
The law on abnormally dangerous activities is the easiest case to
apply the theory of this article. However, the theory applies equally
well to nuisances, which is the subject of this article. Most of the
standard environmental interferences, such as air or water pollution,
have been treated as nuisances under tort law.
Nuisance law has not been articulated clearly. The theory of this
article suggests a clear interpretation for the rules governing nuisance
law. First, consider the basic legal definition of a nuisance: an
intentional, nontrespassory and unreasonable invasion into the quiet
use and enjoyment of property. Intentional, in nuisance law, has
always had a meaning very similar to its meaning in the context of
trespass law: it is enough if the defendant was aware of the nuisance.
There is no need on the part of the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant aimed to do harm to the plaintiff. The term nontrespassory
has always had the effect of distinguishing between invasions that
interfere with exclusive possession of property or a portion of it (e.g.,
a boulder hurled onto the plaintiffs property) and invasions that
merely make it less desirable to remain in possession of property
(e.g., smoke).
Perhaps the most important term in the definition of nuisance is
unreasonable. There have been efforts to settle its meaning, but many
of them are questionable. For example, the Restatement (Second)
Section 826 says:
An intentional invasion of another's interest in the use and
enjoyment of land is unreasonable if:
(a) the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor's
conduct, or
(b) the harm caused by the conduct is serious and the
financial burden of compensating for this and similar harm to
others would not make the continuation of the conduct not
feasible.24
23 The approach of this paper applies the theory of externalities to nuisance law, in an
effort to understand the doctrine. An alternative approach to the economics of nuisance can be
traced to the transaction cost analysis developed by Coase. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem
of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Thomas W. Merrill, Tresspass, Nuisance, and the Costs
of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1985); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and
Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965 (2004).
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: UNREASONABLENESS OF INTENTIONAL INVASION
§ 826 (1977).
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This definition is questionable because it refers to the actor's
conduct rather than his activity. The core question is whether the
actor's activity is one that imposes too many risks on others given its
benefits (or given the costs reciprocated by others). The second
provision of Section 826 is almost useless, because it implies that
strict liability should apply to any nontrivial interference with a
person's use and enjoyment of land.
The theory of this article suggests that the rules of Section 520 are
equally applicable to nuisance disputes. The first three factors should
be reworded so that they apply to nuisance disputes. The appropriate
test for unreasonableness under nuisance law can be articulated as
follows:
(a) existence of a high degree of interference with the quiet
use and enjoyment of land of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm resulting from that interference
will be substantial to the typical member of the community;
(c) inability to eliminate the interference by the exercise of
reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common
usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is
carried on and;
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed
by its dangerous attributes.
The first three factors of this test require that the interference be
substantial even when the actor is taking reasonable care. As in the
case of abnormally dangerous activities, the first three factors should
be treated as minimal requirements for nuisance liability. If, in other
words, the interference would be trivial if the actor took reasonable
care, then the interference should not be considered a nuisance, and
there is no need to examine the remaining factors of the test.
The last factor asks the court to compare the benefits externalized
by the activity and the costs externalized. When the benefits are
substantial, the last factor suggests that the court should be reluctant
to impose liability on a nuisance theory. Consider, for example, the
noise generated by a fire station. Suppose it is a particularly busy fire
station. The noise generated by fire trucks constantly moving in and
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out of the station with their alarms running could be deemed to
substantially interfere with the quiet use and enjoyment of land by
neighbors. However, the neighbors also benefit by being located close
to the fire station. Since those benefits are substantial and widely
dispersed, the neighbors should not be allowed to impose strict
liability on a nuisance theory against the fire station. There is no
economic basis for using liability as an incentive to force the fire
station to reconsider its location decision.
Nuisance law does not provide for compensation to the extra-
sensitive plaintiff.25 The justification for this well-settled piece of the
law is best understood in terms of the model of this article. A
nuisance exists, under the model here, when the externalized costs
associated with an activity are substantially in excess of externalized
benefits. The comparison of externalized costs and benefits is made
with respect to statistical averages, not to any particular plaintiff. If,
on the basis of statistical averages, the externalized costs associated
with an activity are not substantially greater than the externalized
benefits, then the activity is not a nuisance under the theory here. If a
particular plaintiff suffers a severe injury under these conditions, that
harm may be actionable under some other tort theory such as
negligence, but it is not actionable under nuisance law.
Local conditions play an obviously important role in nuisance law.
In particular, the last three factors (d, e, and f) of the test proposed
here all depend on local conditions. Most environmental pollutants
are regulated because of the risk of harm they impose on people
located near the source. In most cases, the risk of harm declines as
people move further from the source. Thus, externalized costs are
likely to be substantial near the source and declining to zero as one
moves further away. Strict liability provides incentives for the
pollution generator to locate in regions in which externalized costs are
insignificant.
E. Shutting Down Nuisances
I have considered the conditions under which a source of an
environmental interference should be held liable under nuisance law.
This is equivalent to examining the proper scope of a liability rule. In
this part, I will briefly consider the conditions under which such a
source should be enjoined or, in simpler terms, shut down.
Nuisance law, unlike trespass law, is a balancing regime.
Decisions to impose damages or to enjoin are made largely on the
25 See, e.g., Rogers v. Elliott, 15 N.E. 768 (Mass. 1888).
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basis of balancing costs and benefits in nuisance law. This contrasts
with trespass law, which does not typically balance costs against
benefits in order to determine whether an injunction is desirable. For
example, if an actor threatened to send bulldozers over to your
property, you could run to court and get an injunction to stop them.
When you appeared in court to seek the injunction, the judge would
not engage in a balancing inquiry-attempting to determine the extent
of the threatened harm to you and the value of the threatening actor's
conduct-in order to determine whether an injunction should be
issued. The court would hold that the bulldozers would interfere with
your exclusive possession and enjoin the threatening actor. On the
other hand, if the same actor were to threaten to send black smoke
from his furnace out over your property, it would be far more difficult
to enjoin his activity because the court would engage in a balancing
test. And since at the time you appeared in court, the threatened harm
had not occurred and was merely speculative, you probably would not
obtain an injunction.
Some nuisances are enjoined. The law on injunctions has not been
set out with clarity. In Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,26 the New
York court reversed a preexisting state doctrine that favored the
granting of injunctions for any substantial unreasonable invasions.
The court held that in the presence of a great disparity between the
economic value of the nuisance generator's activity and the harm
imposed on the victims, courts should issue damage awards rather
than injunctions. The reason underlying the decision was consistent
with long-standing principles of equity. Under those principles, an
injunction would be appropriate only when the benefits of an
injunction appeared to be greater than the costs. In Boomer, the court
decided that the costs of an injunction, in terms of economic injury to
the community created by the forced closure of a large employer,
would be greater than the harms imposed by the nuisance generator.
If damage payments accurately reflected all of the losses suffered
by victims, there would never be a need to issue an injunction.
Consider Figure 1 again. If external costs are very high and external
benefits are nonexistent (or miniscule), the optimal scale of the
offending activity is zero (notice that the intersection of MSC (very
high externality) and MPB does not occur for any positive scale
decision). If damage awards correctly measured losses suffered by
victims, every case involving extremely high external costs and
miniscule external benefits (i.e., to MSC (very high externality) and
MPB in Figure 1) would be shut down, in effect, by damage awards.
26 257 N.E. 2d 871 (N.Y. 1970).
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Given this, the question immediately arises why injunctions are ever
issued.
The reason for issuing injunctions is that damage awards do not
compensate for all of the losses suffered by victims of an
environmental interference. If the nuisance is sufficiently offensive, it
will impose large subjective losses on victims. Those subjective
losses will not be included in damage awards. For example, suppose
an environmental nuisance is so offensive that the victims are forced
to sell their homes, at a great loss, and move. The victims would
suffer a great objective loss, specifically the measurable market value
of their homes, and a great subjective loss as well, which is the excess
over the objective price that they would demand if forced to sell their
homes immediately.
It follows from this that if the environmental interference is so
offensive that the optimal scale of the activity is zero-i.e., the
scenario appears to fit in the depiction in Figure 1 of MSC (very high
externality) coupled with MSB (low externality)-then an injunction
rather than a damage award should be issued. The reason is that the
injunction reduces the likelihood of error by forcing the nuisance
generator to prove that it really is capable of operating while covering
all of the social costs if it wishes to continue in operation.
In this framework, a shut-down order should be governed by a
cost-benefit analysis, consistent with equity principles. If social
welfare appears to be greater if the nuisance generator continues to
operate while paying damages rather than shutting down completely,
an injunction would be inappropriate. Since strict nuisance liability is
appropriate whenever external costs exceed external benefits, the
shut-down condition is more demanding. In particular, a shut-down
order is appropriate only when external costs exceed external benefits
and the total sum by which external costs exceed external benefits is
greater than the total sum by which private benefits exceed private
costs.
27
Instead of a shut-down, consider an abatement order, or imposition
of a binding emission standard. The principles described for the case
of a shut-down order apply equally to that of an abatement order or
emission standard. The standard should be imposed, or enforced by a
court, only if the social benefits of the standard are greater than the
27 See Hylton, Missing Markets, supra note 6. A closely related issue is that of "coming to
the nuisance". For the most part, the law does not provide immediate protection to the person
who arrived first. See, e.g., Ensign v. Walls, 34 N.W.2d 549 (Mich. 1948). This is consistent
with the cost-benefit approach described here. If the externalized harms exceed externalized
benefits by a sufficiently large margin (specifically, if the net externalized harm exceeds the net
internalized benefit) the nuisance generator should be shut down, whether or not he arrived first.
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social costs. In other words, cost-benefit analysis should apply to the
enforcement of all command-and-control environmental standards.28
The cost-benefit test governing injunctions does not prevent courts
from regulating negative externalities. In this framework, the scope of
liability rules is much broader than that of injunctions. A regulatory
authority denied the power to enforce an emission standard can
always achieve the desired result through a liability rule. Of course,
the liability rule itself is contestable on the basis of the test comparing
externalized costs and benefits.
Recall the four types of regulatory regimes examined in the
introduction of this article: public with command-and-control, public
with liability rules, private with command-and-control, and private
with liability rules. This discussion of nuisance law suggests that
private with command-and-control has indeed been a part of
traditional nuisance law. However, the scope of the command-and-
control approach has been unclear. The theory presented here has
implications for its ideal scope. I will return to this issue.
F. Nuisance, Economic Development, and Regional Variation
The fundamental economic test determining nuisance status
examines the ratio of externalized costs and externalized benefits
29
associated with some environmental injury. If the externalized
25 For informative discussions of the cost-benefit controversy in environmental law, see
Hsu, Shi-Ling, On the Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmental Law, 35 ENVTL. L. 135
(2005); Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive
Rationality, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555 (2004); David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit
Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335 (2006); Stephen F. Williams, Cost Benefit Analysis
Colloquy: Squaring the Vicious Circle, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 257 (2001); Michael Abramowicz,
Toward a Jurisprudence of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1708 (2003). The Hsu
article is a critique of FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (New Press, 2004). See also Alan Carlin,
The New Challenge to Cost-Benefit Analysis, 28 REG. Fall 2005, at 19. For those who think that
the application of cost-benefit analysis is necessarily bad for the environment, the experience in
China should be taken into consideration. The authorities there generally ignore the protests of
citizens threatened with pollution from new industrial plans. See Protest in China: Mobilized by
Mobile, THE ECONOMIST, June 23-29, 2007, at 48-49. Environmental regulation in China, to
the extent that it takes place at all, is conducted under an approach that often ignores the costs
imposed on citizens by industrial pollution sources.
29 On the evidence for external benefits from industrial plants, see Michael Greenstone &
Enrico Moretti, Bidding for Industrial Plants: Does Winning a 'Million Dollar Plant' Increase
Welfare? (MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 04-39, November 2004),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-623122. Greenstone and Moretti find evidence of a
positive effect on labor earnings in winning and adjacent counties, as well as positive effects on
property values from the opening of a large industrial plant. The property value increase may
reflect external benefits that were not capitalized into property values at the moment the new
plant opened. Increasing returns to scale in location provides a broad theoretical basis for
thinking that industrialization often externalizes benefits in addition to costs, see Gilles
Duranton & Diego Puga, Micro-Foundations of Urban Agglomeration Economies (CEPR
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benefits are greater than or equal to externalized costs, then strict
nuisance liability is inappropriate, and an injunction even less so. If
the externalized costs are substantially greater than externalized
benefits, or substantially greater than the costs externalized by the
typical activity in the community, strict nuisance liability is
appropriate.
This approach has clear implications for the growth of nuisance
law in a developing economy. In less developed economies, we
should observe fewer activities that should be regarded as nuisances.
There are several reasons for this. First, if some geographic areas are
devoted to industry, for a range of low-level interferences the vast
majority of environmental harms emitted by one industrial activity
may be equivalent to those emitted by other activities within the
industrial community. Where there is a reciprocal exchange of harm
among activities, there is no reason to prefer strict nuisance liability
over negligence. For example, if the upstream company pollutes the
water, forcing the downstream firm to clean the water, while the
downstream company pollutes the air, forcing the upstream company
to install filters, and both companies cross-externalize equivalent
costs, the same activity levels will be observed under strict liability
and under negligence. Given this, there is no reason to opt for strict
liability instead of negligence. And as long as the interferences are of
a low-level sort and the number of residences is small, individuals
who move into the region can be treated as having assumed the risk
This "reciprocal harm" test suggests an immediate justification for the
traditional locality test under nuisance law.
30
The second reason we should observe fewer nuisances-i.e.,
things that should be deemed nuisances-in developing economies is
that the external benefits associated with industrial development are
greater in developing economies than in developed economies.
Consider, for example, an economy that is near the subsistence level.
An industry that enters and produces will provide far greater benefits
to all of the members of the population than would be observed by the
same entry occurring in a developed economy. A large firm that
enters, employing workers and producing goods, in a near-subsistence
Discussion Paper No. 4062, September 2003), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=468960.
30 Of course, the reciprocity norm should be understood to apply to continuous low-level
disturbances. The release of a toxic gas is a different matter. The notion of reciprocal harms
carries within it the implication that the harms are of a low-level sort. If, for example, the parties
each could release deadly chemicals into the environment, that sort of exchange could not
continue in a reciprocal fashion. One side would be destroyed and that would be the end of the
exchange. Also, once the number of residences becomes large, the nature of the region may
change in a way that makes it appropriate to consider the low-level interferences as nuisances.
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economy would substantially affect the living standards of all
members of the population, enabling them to engage in other
activities more productively. On the other hand, in the case of an
advanced economy, the entry of a large employer primarily affects the
living standards of its own employees and its own consumers, and
even in those cases not by much in light of their preexisting
alternatives.
Since the external benefits associated with any productive activity
are larger in an impoverished economy, ordinary industrial activities
will confer substantial external benefits over the whole economy in a
poor country. This is one reason that it makes sense, on economic
grounds, to tolerate a higher level of environmental interferences in
developing economies than in developed economies. This is what has
been observed: developing economies typically have higher levels of
pollution than developed economies, and modern developed
economies, such as the United States, have been through a period of
industrial development in which pollution was far worse than it is
today. This argument helps explain the infamous Summers
memorandum on the location of polluting industries. 31 The Summers
memorandum was politically controversial and led to a great deal of
criticism of its author, Larry Summers. 32 But the economic reasoning
of the memorandum was sound and consistent with the explanation of
nuisance law provided here.
For economically advanced economies, the ratio of externalized
costs to externalized benefits increases sharply for the environmental
interferences associated with common industrial activities. The
employment, productivity, and consumption benefits offered by any
particular industry are typically narrower and concentrated to direct
employees and consumers. Moreover, in robust asset markets, such as
that for land, many externalized benefits are captured in asset prices.
As a consequence, the benefits of industrial activity are not
externalized to the general public in such a large degree as in
underdeveloped economies. Since the opportunity cost, in terms of
reduced consumption, of additional environmental purity is relatively
low in advanced economies, the externalized costs of environmental
31 For the text of the memo, see Memorandum from Lawrence H. Summers, Chief
Economist, World Bank (Dec. 12, 1991), available at http://conservationfinance.wordpress.
com/2006/09/19/toxic-waste-and-the-larry-summers-memo.
32 For a sample of the criticism, see Basil Enwegbara, Toxis Colonialism: Lawrence
Summers andLet Africans Eat Pollution, THE TECH, ONLINE EDITION, April 6, 2001, available
at http://www-tech.mit.edu/V121/N16/coll6guest.16c.html. The view expressed in the
Summers memorandum could have been presented in a more tactful way. Criticism focusing on
the style rather than the content of the argument is probably appropriate.
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harm associated with industry are likely to be greater than the
externalized benefits associated with it.
The upshot is that an aggressive effort to internalize the external
costs associated with environmental harms is a sensible approach for
developed economies. However, even in developed countries, there
should be some sensitivity to local conditions. Just as the ratio of
externalized costs and benefits might differ greatly between a
developed and underdeveloped economy, so might the ratio differ
between regions of a developed country. As a general rule,
internalization should occur when the ratio of externalized costs to
benefits exceeds one, whether this occurs in a developed or
underdeveloped region.
Suppose there are two adjacent regions and pollution drifts from
one into the other. The ratio test described here applies in a
straightforward way. Just as externalized costs can cross state lines,
so can externalized benefits. If the externalized costs (crossing the
state lines) exceed the externalized benefits (crossing state lines), the
ratio test implies that the pollution generator should be held strictly
liable. On the other hand, if pollution drifts across boundaries into a
region in which the ratio test disfavors internalization (because the
benefits externalized by the polluting source exceed the costs), then
strict nuisance liability would be inappropriate. This may seem unfair
because it would permit a polluter in one state to send pollution
across state boundaries without being held strictly liable. But the cost-
benefit test proposed here is in no sense dependent upon state
boundaries. If externalized costs in the form of pollution cross state
boundaries, externalized benefits may cross the same boundaries. If
that is the case, the transboundary polluter should not be held strictly
liable."
My approach may seem similar to Thomas Merrill's "Golden
Rule" analysis of transboundary pollution.34 However, it differs in
important respects and delivers different results. Merrill's approach
focuses on equal treatment of home and foreign pollution sources.
Under my approach, the underlying question is whether pollution
sources in the two states externalize reciprocal (and generally
insignificant) costs, or whether the pollution source externalizes
benefits across state lines in addition to costs. If neither of these
conditions holds, then my approach favors strict nuisance liability
33 For an approach that is similar in some respects, see Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules
for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L. J. 931 (1997).
34 Id.
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against the transboundary polluter even if the receiving state does not
impose strict liability on its own polluters.
35
Internalization can take place through taxes designed to reflect the
external costs of environmental injury. Alternatively, internalization
can take place through nuisance law. Government enforcement
through taxation would take advantage of scale economies in the
centralization of enforcement efforts, but the agency cost problem
would remain. Private enforcement through nuisance actions avoids
the agency cost problem, but introduces inefficiencies associated with
decentralized enforcement. The ideal environmental enforcement
regime for an advanced economy should minimize decentralization
inefficiencies and agency costs. Public enforcement, the norm for
environmental law enforcement today, has the flaw of doing too little
to minimize the agency cost problem. And this is not the only flaw of
the modern public enforcement regime for environmental law.
III. TOWARD AN IDEAL ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT REGIME
An optimal environmental regulation regime would minimize the
sum of the costs of environmental harms, the costs of avoiding those
harms, and the administrative costs of environmental law
enforcement. The problem I am concerned with here is finding the
right regulatory standard and the right mix of private and public
enforcement. The optimal regulatory regime would adopt a legal
standard and a mixture of private and public enforcement that
minimizes the total social costs associated with environmental harms,
consistent with existing resource constraints.
A. Finding the Optimal Mix of Public and Private Enforcement
Since public enforcement is often suboptimal because of the
agency cost problem, and private enforcement is suboptimal because
of decentralization inefficiencies, the ideal environmental law
enforcement regime is unlikely to be a system of purely public or
purely private enforcement. The ideal system should seek a
combination of public and private effort that avoids the most costly
features of each type of enforcement. It follows that the ideal system
would rely on public enforcement where decentralization
inefficiencies were most severe and unlikely to be corrected within a
decentralized private system. The system would also rely on private
33 Admittedly, nuisance cases involving pollution across state lines are preempted by
federal law. See Jonathan H. Adler, Warming Up to Climate Change Litigation, 93 VA. L. REV.
(IN BRIEF) 61, 64 (May 21, 2007).
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enforcement as the default pattern, since the agency cost problem is
always present in a system of public enforcement.
To simplify this discussion, let us set aside for the moment the
problem of finding the optimal regulatory standard. Assume that the
regulatory standard is strict liability for environmental injuries.
1. Identification, Discovery, and Enforcement
Public enforcement has been considered desirable in the
environmental setting because of the inefficiencies associated with
decentralized private enforcement. One of the major inefficiencies is
connected to the incentives to identify and to discover the source of
environmental injury. Some environmental injuries are obvious to the
victims, and yet the victims are unlikely on their own to discover the
source of the injury. For example, if a firm dumps toxic chemicals
into the water supply in the middle of the night, victims will discover
the injury soon enough but may be unable to discover the source of
the injury. Some environmental injuries, however, may not even be
obvious to the victims for a long time. A colorless and odorless gas
that is toxic and results in injury that is realized only after a long
period may remain as a source of environmental harm for a long
period before victims identify it as a source of harm. They may
attribute any injuries they suffer to other causes, such as lifestyle
decisions.
One of the key reasons victims may fail to identify the injury and
discover the source of harm is the distribution of costs and benefits
from such efforts. A victim who investigated the source of some
environmental harm would have an incentive to do so only up to the
level of his private benefit from discovery. For example, if the victim
can gain a compensation payment of no more than $10,000 from the
source, the victim will not invest more than $10,000 into the effort of
discovering the source. If discovery of the source requires an
investment of $50,000, no victim will have an incentive to invest into
the discovery process. Similarly, if the harm itself is difficult to
identify, some victim would have to take it on his own to monitor the
local environment, without being sure of any gain that would come
about as a result. Because of this public goods problem, such efforts
are unlikely to be observed.
In addition to these examples of inadequate incentives for
identification and discovery, there is also the familiar problem of
inadequate incentives for enforcement. Even if every victim knew
with certainty the nature of the environmental harm and its source,
incentives to enforce may still be lacking. The reason is that each
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victim would be better off letting someone else enforce rather than
investing resources into enforcement on his own. If the first person to
enforce would secure a global settlement or judgment, the incentive to
enforce for any particular victim would be weak. Since the first
person to enforce would obtain a judgment for everyone, every victim
would prefer to wait for someone else to be first to enforce, in order
to avoid the cost of enforcement and at the same time secure its
benefit. Even if the first person to enforce can only gain an
individualized settlement or judgment, the incentive to wait remains.
Because the first person must establish liability on the part of the
defendant, every victim would have an incentive to let some other
victim sue first, in order to establish a precedent on which later
victims could rely in prosecuting their private claims.
The general lesson suggested by these incentive problems is that
there are distinguishable stages of enforcement in which inadequate
incentives are likely to be observed. First is the identification stage,
which involves learning of the existence of an environmental injury.
Second is the discovery stage, which involves discovering the source
of the environmental injury. Third is the enforcement stage.
2. Public Enforcement's Advantage
It is well known that the class action mechanism provides a
solution to the public goods problem in enforcement. With class
action litigation or enforcement, there is no need to rely on public
enforcement as a solution to the public goods problem. The class
action device effectively bundles the enforcement claims of multiple
victims into one. This alters incentives so that the investment into
enforcement efforts will be undertaken whenever the cost of
enforcement is less than the aggregate harm caused by the injury.
Although less obvious, the class action mechanism also provides a
potential solution to the incentive problems in discovery. Once an
environmental injury has been identified, the cost of source discovery
may be so great that no individual victim has an incentive to bring an
enforcement action. But if claims are pooled into an aggregate
judgment, the party with the right to sue for that judgment is far more
likely to have an incentive to invest into discovery of the source.
Suppose there are 10 victims, each suffering an injury of $10,000.
Suppose the cost of discovering the source of the harm is $10,000. A
class-action enforcer would have an incentive to invest in discovering
the source as long as he could secure 10 percent of the judgment.
The core decentralization inefficiency is the production of
information identifying environmental harms. Environmental injuries
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that are unlikely to be detected for long periods by victims will not be
discovered in the absence of some monitoring of the environment and
disclosure of information on harmful pollutants. This is unlikely to
occur under any private enforcement scheme, with or without the
class action mechanism.
This suggests that public enforcement can be reduced to the central
feature of monitoring and disclosing information. Thus, the central
role for government in the regulation of environmental injury is
monitoring and disclosure. Once disclosure of harm occurs, the
enforcement role can be delegated in most cases to private
enforcement agencies.36 Of course, since discovery of the source will
often occur at the same time as identification of the harm, the
monitoring and disclosure function will usually involve both.
The core mission for public enforcement agencies is the
production of information identifying harmful pollutants and their
sources. Should public enforcement agencies be limited to this role?
Unless public agencies can be shown to be more efficient than private
agencies at enforcement efforts, public agencies should be limited to
the sphere of activity in which they have a comparative advantage. I
am aware of no reliable empirical evidence that public enforcement
agencies would be more efficient enforcers, in cases in which the both
the harm and the offender have already been identified.
Public enforcement agencies might be more efficient enforcers, in
cases in which both the injury and the offender have already been
identified, if there are scale economies in environmental law
enforcement that could not be replicated within a private enforcement
regime. However, public enforcement agencies are far more
vulnerable to what I have described as the agency cost problem.
Given this, a system of public enforcement is unlikely to be more
efficient in general than a system of largely private enforcement.
B. The Legal Standard
It might seem to follow from the discussion of nuisance law and
development that a rule of strict liability should be the norm in
advanced economies. However, the rule adopted by the law should be
the economic norm reflected in traditional nuisance law: compare the
externalized benefits of the actor's activity with its externalized costs.
The argument in favor of the traditional nuisance standard is based on
36 For an early proposal for a private environmental law enforcement system based on
class actions, see Frank I. Michelman, Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on
Calabresi"s Costs, 80 YALE L. J. 647 (1971).
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two claims: first, that it is optimal in terms of regulating activities,
and, second, that it encourages the disclosure of information to courts.
In an advanced economy, the traditional nuisance test will operate
in a manner that results in strict liability in probably the vast majority
of cases in which there is a serious environmental injury. The
exceptional cases are: (1) those in which there is no serious
environmental injury that distinguishes the nuisance generator from
any number of other background activities, and (2) those in which the
external benefits of the source exceed the external harms. The
traditional test permits courts to reach different conclusions in these
cases, depending on the strength of the evidence and the
circumstances of the location. Moreover, this approach provides
incentives for nuisance generators to find locations in which external
harms are insignificant.
Consider the first exception, in which there is no serious
environmental harm distinguishable from other background activities.
As a general rule, these cases are inappropriate for strict liability. The
reason is if harms are trivial or reciprocal among activities, the
negligence standard is sufficient for encouraging optimal incentives.
There is no need to impose strict liability in order to discourage the
activity.
The legal standard should permit defendants to contest cases in
which there is no substantial evidence of harm or in which the
evidence of harm is speculative. In a regime in which public enforcers
identify harms, there is still a need for an independent evaluation of
the seriousness of those harms. This is implied by the existence of the
agency cost problem. In particular, if public enforcement agents are
capable of being biased or corrupted, their assessments have to be
subjected to independent tests. Moreover, private parties, such as the
alleged injurer, may have private information bearing on the
seriousness of the harm that should be aired before an impartial judge.
The controversy over global warming provides a useful illustration
of this point. The science of global warming appears to have gained
substantial acceptance, but the economics of global warming remains
hotly contested.37 If a government were to impose constraints on
sources of global warming, the standard proposed here would permit
a regulated party to contest those regulations on the basis of the
37 BJORN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL STATE
OF THE WORLD (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001); BJORN LOMBORG, COOL IT: THE SKEPTICAL
ENVIRONMENTALIST'S GUIDE TO GLOBAL WARMING (Knopf Publishing Group, 2007). For a
review of the first Lomborg book, see Douglas A. Kysar, Some Realism about Environmental
Skepticism: Bjorn Lomborg's 'The Skeptical Environmentalist' (August 13, 2002), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-323460.
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nuisance standard. The government would be required to present
evidence that the regulated party's activity externalized harms in
excess of externalized benefits. 38 The regulated party would be
permitted to contradict the government's evidence. If the court
concluded that the regulated party's conduct did not produce a
nuisance, any command-and-control regulation would have to be
viewed as a taking by the government.
In relatively wealthy economies, such as North America or
Europe, there is a good chance that the externalized harms from
production processes that emit greenhouse gases exceed externalized
benefits. If so, an internalizing tax or liability charge would be
appropriate on economic grounds. However, in relatively poor
countries, such as China, the externalized benefits of local industry, in
terms of pulling people out of miserable poverty, are probably greater
than the externalized costs. Production taxes applied to greenhouse
gas sources in wealthy economies and consumption taxes applied to
goods imported from greenhouse gas producers in poor countries
should be sufficient to regulate the production of greenhouse gases.
These charges could be brought home to the relevant sources through
the liability system as well in the form of class actions.39
To elaborate, consider two regions, A and B. A is wealthy and B is
relatively poor. Although global warming has been presented as a
uniform threat to all regions, the external costs from greenhouse gas
emissions will probably differ between the two regions. The wealthy
region will be better capable of reducing the damaging effects of
greenhouse gas emissions (if those effects are ever realized). Suppose,
then, that the external cost per unit of production (of those processes
that generate greenhouse gas emissions) is $100 in region A and $150
in region B. Suppose that the external benefit per unit of production is
$0 in region A and $300 in region B. An internalizing tax or liability
charge that works out to be the equivalent of $100 per unit of
production in region A would help correct incentives of producers in
region A. In region B, no tax or liability charge should be applied,
since, on net, the externalities generated in region B are positive. This
simple example provides support for the reluctance of some
developing countries (China is the best example) to impose stringent
38 On measuring the external costs of greenhouse gas emission, see European
Commission, Directorate-General for Research, External Costs: Research Results on Socio-
Environmental Damages Due to Electricity and Transport (2003), available at
http://www.exteme.info/extempr.pdf.
39 Class action lawyers could sue to create a fund in which the pollution source would pay
the external cost per unit of production. There are other private litigation models to consider, see
Daniel A. Farber, Basic Compensation for the Victims of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REv.
1605 (2007).
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controls on greenhouse gas emissions. Since production in region B
also imposes costs on region A of $100 per unit of region B output,
region A should impose tariffs on goods imported from region B in
order internalize extra-regional external environmental costs. The
tariffs should be designed to impose a charge of $100 per unit of
production in region B. Alternatively, sellers in region A of products
(connected to greenhouse gas emissions) imported from region B
could be held liable for domestic pollution costs. Aside from these
actions, there is no reason under this model for region B to tax or to
constrain its own producers.
Admittedly, the global warming example is a special case because
it involves a cost that has to be controlled because of its aggregate
global effects. 40 The more routine cases involve pollutants that should
be regulated because of their harmful effects to people in the
immediate area of the source. In the routine cases, location clearly
matters. A regulated party should be permitted to bring in evidence
that its interferences are not substantial in its location.
The second exceptional case in which the cost-benefit standard
makes a difference is that in which the nuisance generator is also a
source of substantial external benefits in its location (or in which the
nuisance generator's activities are no more harmful than those of the
average activity in the location). In such cases, the nuisance generator
should be permitted to offer evidence that it is a source of significant
externalized benefits to the community, and that those benefits exceed
the external costs connected with environmental interferences.
For example, consider cell phone towers. Suppose evidence were
developed in the future indicating that microwave radiation from cell
phone towers is a source of substantial harm to residents who live or
work near the towers. A strict liability rule would make the owners of
cell phone towers liable for the harms. This would give the owners
incentives to alter the technology to reduce harm to others, or to
locate the towers in areas in which the harm to neighbors would be
minimal. The cost-benefit rule of traditional nuisance law, however,
would impose liability only if the externalized costs were large in
relation to externalized benefits.
40 Because of this, some have argued that common law nuisance, as a localized solution,
should not play a serious role in the regulation of climate change. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Wiener,
Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961
(2007), However, I have argued here that nuisance law provides a very good fiamework for
regulating climate change. The comparison of externalized costs to externalized benefits should
produce a regime in which liability charges are brought home to sources of greenhouse gases in
most developed areas.
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What sort of externalized benefits might exist in this example?
Suppose the network of cell phone towers in a particular town became
an important element of public safety. For example, communication
by cell phones among public safety officials could be an important
means of minimizing harm during adverse weather conditions. These
public safety benefits could be estimated and quantified - in terms of
the value of lives saved and injuries avoided. A modem nuisance law
regime would require both sides of the dispute to present estimates of
externalized costs and externalized benefits. Such a standard would
allow the private information of both parties to be revealed to the
court.
The cell phone tower owners should be held strictly liable to a
particular set of victims only if the external harms due to microwave
radiation were greater than the value of the public-safety benefits to
the victims. This rule might permit individual plaintiffs to collect if
the benefits they receive are trivial (say, because the public benefits
go largely to a different population) while the costs are substantial.
Even if the benefits were substantial, a particular victim might be
permitted to recover under this rule if the costs were far greater (e.g.,
a high risk of cancer). However, some minimal risk would have to be
tolerated under this rule if there is a substantial public safety benefit.
C. Optimal Mix and Legal Standard
Let us return to the mix of regimes considered at the start: public
enforcement with command-and-control, public enforcement with
liability rules, private enforcement with command-and-control, and
private enforcement with liability rules. Modem environmental law
consists largely of the public with command-and-control model, with
nuisance suits in the background. I have suggested a mixed
enforcement regime that has a different makeup. Public enforcement
should for the most part be present at the base and at the edges of a
modem environmental enforcement regime. Public enforcement is
necessary at the base, in order to identify harms that would be
invisible to most victims. Public enforcement would also be necessary
as a backstop to private enforcement, to handle the cases in which
private enforcement incentives were to weak. The core of the modem
enforcement regime would be privately operated.4'
41 Obviously, this has implications for preemption of nuisance lawsuits. Since public
enforcement would assume a complementary role, preemption should not be a difficult issue
under the approach proposed here.
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1. Allocation of Responsibilities Among Enforcement Regimes
The public with command-and-control regime is comparatively
efficient when private enforcement is unlikely to occur and when
liability rules are unlikely to provide a deterrent effect. One setting in
which private enforcement is unlikely, already discussed, is when the
source evades detection, as in the case of a criminal who poisons a
water source in the middle of the night. Another setting in which
private enforcement is unlikely is when the sources of harm are small
and geographically dispersed. Suppose the sources of harm are 1000
owners of cars that violate optimal emission standards. Given the cost
of rounding up so many defendants, individual victims are unlikely to
take enforcement into their own hands. If, in addition, some of those
1000 owners are judgment proof with respect to the damages that
would be asserted, liability rules are unlikely to have an effective
deterrent effect. This is a setting in which public with command-and-
control has an advantage over the other regimes. However, command-
and-control environmental rules should be enforced only if they
satisfy cost-benefit tests.42
The public with liability rules regime is comparatively efficient
when private enforcement is unlikely to occur and when liability rules
are likely to provide a reliable deterrent effect. Again, consider the
case of 1000 owners of cars that violate optimal emission standards.
If a scheme existed for internalizing the externalities, it would be
preferable to command-and-control. The reason for this is that any
actor whose private gain exceeded the harm imposed on others would
simply pay for the external harm and continue in his activity.
Consider, for example, a scheme in which drivers pay an internalizing
tax for each gallon of gasoline. More generally, the public with
liability rules regime is equivalent to using taxes to regulate
environmental interferences.
The private with command-and-control regime is comparatively
efficient when the source . of harm has been identified and the
externalized harm exceeds externalized benefits by such a wide
margin that the nuisance generator should be shut down. The private
enforcer in this case seeks an injunction from a court. The injunction
forces the polluter to either shut down or to buy out the injunction
from the private enforcer. Presumably these cases will be infrequent.
42 It immediately follows that prohibitions in the law on the consideration of cost-benefit
analysis in the enforcement of command-and-control rules would have no place in an optimal
regime. See, e.g., Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 464-71 (2001) (EPA
must establish national ambient air quality standards to protect public health and may not
consider cost in setting these standards).
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The private with liability rules regime is comparatively efficient
when the source of harm has been identified (typically a single large
source, rather than dispersed atomistic sources) and the externalized
harms exceed externalized benefits, but not by such a wide margin to
suggest that a complete shut down of the polluter would be socially
desirable. The majority of environmental interferences should fall in
this category. Class action lawsuits against major single-source
polluters would provide the driving force for this regime. The
following table summarizes this argument.
TABLE 1: ALLOCATION OF ENFORCEMENT REGIMES
Public Private
Command- * Identification difficult- * Identification easy-
and- Dispersed atomistic sources / Small number of
Control Judgment proof or sources* Shut down
unresponsive to liability desirable
Liability * Identification difficult- - Identification easy*
Dispersed atomistic sources / Small number of
Responsive to liability sources- Shut down not
desirable / Externalized
costs exceed
externalized benefits
These suggestions for allocating responsibilities among regime
types have immediate implications for the choice of taxes, cap-and-
trade schemes, and liability as instruments for controlling
environmental interferences. Cap-and-trade and tax approaches are
both subject to the agency cost problem identified earlier. Public
enforcement agents may have incentives that diverge from those of
potential victims or from what is in society's best interests. On the
other hand, given that public enforcement is sometimes necessary, the
tax approach is preferable to cap-and-trade. Cap-and-trade schemes
require information on the optimal degree of interference, which is
difficult to obtain. Taxes, in comparison, require less information.43 If
public enforcement is not necessary, private enforcement through
liability rules is preferable because it harnesses the private
information of victims and suffers least from the agency cost
43 This claim about the administrative ease of taxation relative to quantity regulation is a
generalization. There may be counterexamples. See, e.g., Cole and Grossman, supra note 6.
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problem. A loser-pays rule could be incorporated to prevent class
action attorneys from filing frivolous nuisance claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
Common law nuisance doctrine provided the first system of
environmental regulation in English-speaking countries. Today, most
of what modem scholars refer to as environmental regulation is
statutory law. But statutory law often supplants or displaces common
law without reflecting its accumulated wisdom. This is perhaps most
obvious in the field of environmental law, where statutory
interpretation has now taken the place of the careful cost-benefit
balancing of the common law. I have used this article to reexamine
the function of common law nuisance doctrine, and to propose an
environmental law enforcement system that exploits the lessons
reflected in that doctrine.

